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In early December, the U.S. President convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the turbulent eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Shortly after, however, a starkly different strategy for instability emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Shift in Policy

These divergent actions exemplifies the core tenet of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and stopping hostilities—even as this squares with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a top U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative reinforced this, noting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Mixed Signals

This pivot is consequential, but observers warn it is too soon to judge its results. The approach is intertwined with the President’s personal style, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a senior fellow for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Disinterest and Friction

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant dispute has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Targeted Intervention

A comparable confrontation flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the forceful rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Other Powers

Observers describe the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.